Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We study the following classic problem in this setting: "how should the agents divide the value that they collectively create?". One traditional approach in cooperative game theory is to study core stability with the implicit assumption that there are infinite copies of one project, and agents can partition themselves into any number of coalitions. In contrast, we consider a model with a finite number of non-identical projects; this makes computing both high-welfare solutions and core payments highly non-trivial. The main contribution of this paper is a black-box mechanism that reduces the problem of computing a near-optimal core stable solution to the purely algorithmic problem of welfare maximization; we apply this to compute an approximately core stable solution that extracts one-fourth of the optimal social welfare for the class of subadditive valuations. We also show much stronger results for several popular sub-classes: anonymous, fractionally subadditive, and submodular valuations, as well as provide new approximation algorithms for welfare maximization with anonymous functions. Finally, we establish a connection between our setting and the well-studied simultaneous auctions with item bidding; we adapt our results to compute approximate pure Nash equilibria for these auctions.Comment: Under Revie

Approximately Minwise Independence with Twisted Tabulation

A random hash function $h$ is $\varepsilon$-minwise if for any set $S$, $|S|=n$, and element $x\in S$, $\Pr[h(x)=\min h(S)]=(1\pm\varepsilon)/n$. Minwise hash functions with low bias $\varepsilon$ have widespread applications within similarity estimation. Hashing from a universe $[u]$, the twisted tabulation hashing of P\v{a}tra\c{s}cu and Thorup [SODA'13] makes $c=O(1)$ lookups in tables of size $u^{1/c}$. Twisted tabulation was invented to get good concentration for hashing based sampling. Here we show that twisted tabulation yields $\tilde O(1/u^{1/c})$-minwise hashing. In the classic independence paradigm of Wegman and Carter [FOCS'79] $\tilde O(1/u^{1/c})$-minwise hashing requires $\Omega(\log u)$-independence [Indyk SODA'99]. P\v{a}tra\c{s}cu and Thorup [STOC'11] had shown that simple tabulation, using same space and lookups yields $\tilde O(1/n^{1/c})$-minwise independence, which is good for large sets, but useless for small sets. Our analysis uses some of the same methods, but is much cleaner bypassing a complicated induction argument.Comment: To appear in Proceedings of SWAT 201

The Inverse Shapley Value Problem

For $f$ a weighted voting scheme used by $n$ voters to choose between two candidates, the $n$ \emph{Shapley-Shubik Indices} (or {\em Shapley values}) of $f$ provide a measure of how much control each voter can exert over the overall outcome of the vote. Shapley-Shubik indices were introduced by Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik in 1954 \cite{SS54} and are widely studied in social choice theory as a measure of the "influence" of voters. The \emph{Inverse Shapley Value Problem} is the problem of designing a weighted voting scheme which (approximately) achieves a desired input vector of values for the Shapley-Shubik indices. Despite much interest in this problem no provably correct and efficient algorithm was known prior to our work. We give the first efficient algorithm with provable performance guarantees for the Inverse Shapley Value Problem. For any constant \eps > 0 our algorithm runs in fixed poly$(n)$ time (the degree of the polynomial is independent of \eps) and has the following performance guarantee: given as input a vector of desired Shapley values, if any "reasonable" weighted voting scheme (roughly, one in which the threshold is not too skewed) approximately matches the desired vector of values to within some small error, then our algorithm explicitly outputs a weighted voting scheme that achieves this vector of Shapley values to within error \eps. If there is a "reasonable" voting scheme in which all voting weights are integers at most \poly(n) that approximately achieves the desired Shapley values, then our algorithm runs in time \poly(n) and outputs a weighted voting scheme that achieves the target vector of Shapley values to within error $\eps=n^{-1/8}.

Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games

We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study $\alpha$-approximate $k$-equilibria of these games, i.e., outcomes where no group of at most $k$ players can deviate such that each member increases his payoff by at least a factor $\alpha$. We prove that for $\alpha \ge 2$ these games have the finite coalitional improvement property (and thus $\alpha$-approximate $k$-equilibria exist), while for $\alpha < 2$ this property does not hold. Further, we derive an almost tight bound of $2\alpha(n-1)/(k-1)$ on the price of anarchy, where $n$ is the number of players; in particular, it scales from unbounded for pure Nash equilibria ($k = 1)$ to $2\alpha$ for strong equilibria ($k = n$). We also settle the complexity of several problems related to the verification and existence of these equilibria. Finally, we investigate natural means to reduce the inefficiency of Nash equilibria. Most promisingly, we show that by fixing the strategies of $k$ players the price of anarchy can be reduced to $n/k$ (and this bound is tight)

Cooperative AI: machines must learn to find common ground

Artificial-intelligence assistants and recommendation algorithms interact with billions of people every day, influencing lives in myriad ways, yet they still have little understanding of humans. Self-driving vehicles controlled by artificial intelligence (AI) are gaining mastery of their interactions with the natural world, but they are still novices when it comes to coordinating with other cars and pedestrians or collaborating with their human operators

The Least-core and Nucleolus of Path Cooperative Games

Cooperative games provide an appropriate framework for fair and stable profit distribution in multiagent systems. In this paper, we study the algorithmic issues on path cooperative games that arise from the situations where some commodity flows through a network. In these games, a coalition of edges or vertices is successful if it enables a path from the source to the sink in the network, and lose otherwise. Based on dual theory of linear programming and the relationship with flow games, we provide the characterizations on the CS-core, least-core and nucleolus of path cooperative games. Furthermore, we show that the least-core and nucleolus are polynomially solvable for path cooperative games defined on both directed and undirected network

Predicting personal traits from facial images using convolutional neural networks augmented with facial landmark information

We consider the task of predicting various traits of a person given an image of their face. We estimate both objective traits, such as gender, ethnicity and hair-color; as well as subjective traits, such as the emotion a person expresses or whether he is humorous or attractive. For sizeable experimentation, we contribute a new Face Attributes Dataset (FAD), having roughly 200,000 attribute labels for the above traits, for over 10,000 facial images. Due to the recent surge of research on Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), we begin by using a CNN architecture for estimating facial attributes and show that they indeed provide an impressive baseline performance. To further improve performance, we propose a novel approach that incorporates facial landmark information for input images as an additional channel, helping the CNN learn better attribute-specific features so that the landmarks across various training images hold correspondence. We empirically analyse the performance of our method, showing consistent improvement over the baseline across traits.Microsoft Researc

False-Name Manipulation in Weighted Voting Games is Hard for Probabilistic Polynomial Time

False-name manipulation refers to the question of whether a player in a weighted voting game can increase her power by splitting into several players and distributing her weight among these false identities. Analogously to this splitting problem, the beneficial merging problem asks whether a coalition of players can increase their power in a weighted voting game by merging their weights. Aziz et al. [ABEP11] analyze the problem of whether merging or splitting players in weighted voting games is beneficial in terms of the Shapley-Shubik and the normalized Banzhaf index, and so do Rey and Rothe [RR10] for the probabilistic Banzhaf index. All these results provide merely NP-hardness lower bounds for these problems, leaving the question about their exact complexity open. For the Shapley--Shubik and the probabilistic Banzhaf index, we raise these lower bounds to hardness for PP, "probabilistic polynomial time", and provide matching upper bounds for beneficial merging and, whenever the number of false identities is fixed, also for beneficial splitting, thus resolving previous conjectures in the affirmative. It follows from our results that beneficial merging and splitting for these two power indices cannot be solved in NP, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, which is considered highly unlikely

Limitations of Majority Agreement in Crowdsourced Image Interpretation

Crowdsourcing can efficiently complete tasks that are difficult to automate, but the quality of crowdsourced data is tricky to evaluate. Algorithms to grade volunteer work often assume that all tasks are similarly difficult, an assumption that is frequently false. We use a cropland identification game with over 2,600 participants and 165,000 unique tasks to investigate how best to evaluate the difficulty of crowdsourced tasks and to what extent this is possible based on volunteer responses alone. Inter-volunteer agreement exceeded 90% for about 80% of the images and was negatively correlated with volunteer-expressed uncertainty about image classification. A total of 343 relatively difficult images were independently classified as cropland, non-cropland or impossible by two experts. The experts disagreed weakly (one said impossible while the other rated as cropland or non-cropland) on 27% of the images, but disagreed strongly (cropland vs. non-cropland) on only 7%. Inter-volunteer disagreement increased significantly with inter-expert disagreement. While volunteers agreed with expert classifications for most images, over 20% would have been mis-categorized if only the volunteers’ majority vote was used. We end with a series of recommendations for managing the challenges posed by heterogeneous tasks in crowdsourcing campaigns

Nobody cares if you liked Star Wars: KNN graph construction on the cheap

International audienceK-Nearest-Neighbors (KNN) graphs play a key role in a large range of applications. A KNN graph typically connects entities characterized by a set of features so that each entity becomes linked to its k most similar counterparts according to some similarity function. As datasets grow, KNN graphs are unfortunately becoming increasingly costly to construct, and the general approach, which consists in reducing the number of comparisons between entities, seems to have reached its full potential. In this paper we propose to overcome this limit with a simple yet powerful strategy that samples the set of features of each entity and only keeps the least popular features. We show that this strategy outperforms other more straightforward policies on a range of four representative datasets: for instance, keeping the 25 least popular items reduces computational time by up to 63%, while producing a KNN graph close to the ideal one